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HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

To see in due perspective Italian developments in the field of private international

law, both in theory and positive law, one has to start with the so-called Mancini
school of the nineteenth century.1 As a side effect of the political ideology of the
"nation," which was the driving spiritual force behind Italy's "Risorgimento"--and
generally behind the political upheavals that took place in Europe after the Restoration was imposed by the Holy Alliance at Napoleon's downfall-a way out from
the state of uncertainty and confusion in which the Statutists had left the subject
of choice of law was found, in the second half of the last century, in the rejection of
territorialism and the enthusiastic acceptance of the idea that law (private law) is
a fundamental part of national life and as such is made for the citizen and, in
principle, governs him even abroad.
In other words, the Italian patriot Pasquale Stanislao Mancini2 and his followers8
maintained that, by nature and history, people are grouped in different "nations,"
each one striving to become an independent State (if not already blessed by such a
fullness of being, as was the case with France, the great model). For the time
being, people belonged to the State-even if it was not the embodiment of their
nation-to which they were attached by the legal bond of citizenship. In matters of
private law, therefore, particularly those of a "personal" character, the citizens of a
State were, as a rule, protected or directed by that State's law, which by right or sound
reason, and possibly according to a general principle of international law, other
States also were bound to apply to them: to their family relationships, for instance.
On the other hand, in contractual matters the "autonomy of the parties" was asserted,
as a consequence of the favor for "individual freedom" which was the liberal, or
democratic, component in the movement for national reawakening that caused Italy
1
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to become an independent, modern State. As to property, however, particularly real
property, a certain authority was still conceded to the local law, the lex situs.
And finally other matters, related to the hazy category of "public policy," remained
under the sway of territorial rules, mainly those enacted by the lex fori. But notwithstanding these "exceptions" or concurrent principles, the leading principle, the
"revolutionary" principle, was the competence of the lex patriae.
Mancini's ideas were influential in shaping the choice-of-law rules adopted by the
Italian Civil code and by several foreign codes, and in inspiring or stabilizing modern
decisional trends in civil law countries. However, after the initial enthusiasm and
propagandizing, a reaction of the theorists soon set in, both in Italy and abroad.
The tenets of the "Italian school" underwent an increasing amount of criticism
where they had made headway, while they met only with cold indifference in common-law countries. More significant, however, than the debates on the interpretation of positive conflicts rules of Mancinian origin and on their value de lege ferenda
for other countries or for international conventions, was the shift of interest that took
place at the end of the century, particularly in Italian legal scholarship, to the
"general theory" of private international law.
II
TiH

THEORETICAL FIA-MWORK

Mancini and his followers, by implication or avowedly, had envisaged the problem
of conflict of laws as a problem of international relations: one set out or looked for

universal principles by which the application of different bodies of national rules
should be settled everywhere, thus solving the conflicts between national sovereignties
as to the extent of the authority of their legal systems, particularly in matters of

private law. By their persuasiveness, doctrinal views (those of the "Italian school,"
of course) were expected to find acceptance in the national legal orders-through
statutes and court 5decisions-and even to inspire the crowning achievement of
multilateral treaties.
But this international or universal approach soon ran into difficulties. The turn
towards positivism, which marked European legal theorizing at the end of the
nineteenth century, brought about the realization that, after all, private international
law rules were far from identical in different States and could not, or could not all,
be considered a part of international law. At the same time, the decline of natural
law ideas had given rise to the need for a new explanation of the legal character
of public international law and its relationship to internal law. Since the aim of
private international law was taken to be the solution of interntional difficulties
'On the Italian rules of private international law, as stated in the preliminary provisions to the civil
code of 1942 (amending the code of 1865, where art. 6-i of the preliminary provisions dealt with
conflict of laws), see the reliable account by McCusker, The Italian Rules of Conflict of Laws, 25
TUL. L. RaV. 70 (195o).
' The Hague conventions on private international law, the Montevideo treaties, and the Bustamante
code were a partial response to that expectation.
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(by the choice of the "competent" law among competing and conflicting municipal

laws), and since some of those rules were supposed to belong to the law of nations
while most of them were clearly imbedded in the internal legal order of the several
States, there arose a pressing need (a theoretical need, to be sure, but with some
practical implications) to place private international law correctly in the general
frame of the current view as to the relationship between national law and international law.6
A. Anzilotti's Views
The answer given to this question by the leading Italian jurist Dionisio Anzilotti
(an answer he later disowned) 7 was a shrewd compromise, one that seemed to fit
exactly that slippery subject, private international law. Anzilotti starts from two
assumptions: (i) that national law and public international law are "separate" legal
orders ("dualistic theory"), so that a rule of public international law can be effective
as to subjects of a State only in so far as it is transformed by the State itself into
part of its own legal system; and (:) that choice-of-law rules, by solving conflicts of
(national) laws, namely conflicts between national sovereignties, fulfill a task
properly belonging to public international law, the law that governs the relationships
between States. Private international law ought to be, therefore, a branch of public
international law; there should be only one set of choice-of-law rules, binding all
members of the international community. But, unfortunately, public international
law is not as yet so perfect and complete as to provide a solution to all difficulties,
large and small, arising from the coexistence of independent States. Confronted with
"'gaps," States must supply their own solution, which is effective as far as it goes,
namely, as far as the authority of the State reaches. Such is the case for conflict-oflaws problems, according to Anzilotti. At the time-and this is still true-there
were not enough choice-of-law rules of an international character: just a few general
principles, at the most. Each State, therefore, had to do on its own what the
international community had so far failed to do, namely, to solve conflicts of laws.
As a result, we have as many national systems of private international law as there
are States, and each is a substitute, for internal purposes, for the missing universal
system of conflicts rules. In short, private international law is national law, but on
an international subject matter: it is "Ersatz" international law.'
Whatever the attractions and inconsistencies of this explanation, it marks the
beginning of the keen interest shown by Italian students of private international
law in the formal character, structure, and general purpose of this kind of legal
rule, rather than in the interpretation, implementation, or criticism of the specific,
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living provisions of Italian (and foreign) private international law.9

Perhaps

9 We

do not mean to suggest that "practical" problems of private international law were and are
utterly neglected in Italy. But, on the whole, legal scholarship has certainly been far more lavishly
spent on theoretical difficulties. Perhaps this preference was due, at least in part, to the early codification
of the subject matter and the scanty output of case law, not to mention the Italian university traditionstill extant-of teaching private international law and public international law as the two parts of a
course on "international law."
Of late, partly as a reaction to excessive theorizing and partly thanks to a greater interest both in
national and foreign statutory and decisional materials, there has been an increase in Italy of articles,
essays, and books on the interpretation or ascertainment of positive rules and trend-.
To cite at random, see: GIANCARLO VENTURINI, GLI INFORTUNI SUL LAVORO NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZONALE PRIVATO ITALIANO (s940); De Nova, Problemi di diritto interlocale ed internazionale privato
relativi ai territori annessi, s COssUNoICAONI E sTUDx 129 (1942); GAETANO ARANOIo Ruiz, LA CAMBIALE
NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE

PRIVATO

(946);

NVALTER ZANNINI,

LA RICERCA DELLA PATERNITA'

NATURALE

NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO (949); Migliazza, L'indegnith a succedere net diritto internazionale
privato italiano, 3 COMUNICAZIONI E STUDI 197 (950); Serra, La designazione della "lex contractus"
(Art. 2 5 disp. prel.), 3 COsaUNICAZIONs a STUD! 177 (1950); Sperduti, Sulla capacita in diritto interna-

zionale privato, con particolare riguardo alla capacita d'obbligarsi per fatto illecito, 4 RivisrA

ITALIANA

282 (1950); GIOVANNI MARIA UBERTAZZI, I RAPPORTI PATIUMONIALI
(195); De Nova, Appunti sull'illecito civile in
TRA CONIUOI NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO
diritto internazionale privato comparato, 4 COSIUNICAZIONI E sTuDs 7 (952); Migliazza, La divisione
ereditaria nel dirtto internazionale privato, 4 COmuNcAzIONI E STUD! 159 (1952); Malintoppi, La
PER LE SCIENZE OIURIDICHE

(n.s.)

legge regolatrice delta ricerca del genitore naturale ed it sistema del rinvio cumulativo, 36 RivIsTA DI
DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE 386 (953); Durante, La legge regolatrice della prova nel dirito internazionale
privato, 37 RrvSTA DI DiRr-ro INTERNAZIONALE 494 (1954); Migliazza, La disciplina delta forma degli
atti di ultima volontl nel dirhto internazionale privato, 6 COMUNIcAZION E STUDs 88 (954); ANTONIO
MALiNTOPPI, DIRITTo UNIFORAIE E DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE

PRIVATO

IN TEMA

DI TRASPORTO

(1955);

(956);

De
DI DiarTo
Nova, Esistenza e capacita del soggetto in diritto internazionale privato italiano, x ScstsrI
INTERNAZIONALE IN ONORE Di TomAso PRAssi 38z (1957); Quadri, Sulla legge applicabile alla "forma"
GIANCARLO

VENTURINI, DIsurTo INTERNAZIONALE

PRIVATO: DIRITI

REALl

ED

OBBLIGAZIONI

dei negozi giuridici, 2 Scarrz DI DiRrro INTERNAZIONALE IN ONORE DI ToMASO PERASSI 233 (1957);
Venturini, Note sulla disciplina di diritto internazionale priveto delle obbligazioni da illecito, 2 ScRr-r
DI DIRUTrO INTERNAZIONALE IN ONORE Di ToNrAso PEiAssl 367 (1957); Quadri, La successione dello
Stato net diritto internazionale privato, 41 RivisTA DI DIRITrO INTFRNAziONALE 51 (1958); ROBERTO
SOCINI, LA FILIAZIONE NEL DIriTro INTERNAZIONALE 'RIVATO (1958); Ruini, L'affiliazione net diritto
internazionale privato, 4 RIvIsr DI DIurrro CVLF 146 (1958); Cassoni, La procura net diritto internazionale privato, 14 Dnuri-ro INTERNAZIONALE 256 (1960); Ferrari Bravo, Gli effetti delle condanne
penali net diritto internazionale privato italiano, 43 RivisrA DI DIRITro INTERNAZIONALE 26 (i960); lVe
Nova, Considerazioni comparative sull'adozione in diritto internazionale privato, 12 Jus, RIVIsTA DI
SCIENZE GIURIDICHE (n.s.) 255 (1961); De Nova, Adoption in Comparative Private International Law,
104 AcAnU
DC DUROT INTERNATIONAL, RacuaIL DES COURS 75 (i96i); Ferrari Bravo, It tuogo di
commissione dell'illecito nel diritto internazionale privato, 7 RivisT DI DIRITTO CIVILE 8o (1961);
Ubertazzi, 1lcomportamento delle parti e la legge regolatrice delle obbligazioni contrattuali, 15 DiRsrro
INTERNAZIONALE 201 (I96I); BENEDE TO CONFORrI, L'asacuzIoNF DELLE OBLIOAziONi NEL Dnri-ro
INTr NAZIONALE PRIVATO (1962); Ferrari Bravo, Aspetti generali delta disciplina della responsabilita per

fatto
illecito nel diritto internazionale privato, 17 ANNALI DELLA FACOLTA' as GIUuSPRUDENZA DELL'UNIVERSITA' DI BARI (1962); VINCENZO STARACE, LA RAPPRESENTANZA NEL DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE iRIVATO
(x962); Ubertazzi, Studi sul contratto di assicurazione nel diritto internazionale privato, 16 Damrro
INTERNAZioALE 319 (x962).

Of course, in treatises and handbooks on the subject the "special part" receives due consideration
(although, usually, in a somewhat stereotyped manner). Court decisions raising interesting points are
reported and commented upon in "'Foro Italiano," "Giurisprudenza Italiana," and other legal journals
(notably the "Rivista di Diritto Internazionale"). Surveys of cases have been published in "Comunicazioni e Studi" and "Diritto Internazionale"; see also Udina, La 1igislation et la jurisprudence
o
italiennes en matitre de droit international privi, de 193 a r934, 30 REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROrr
INTERNATIONAL 357 (935); De Nova, La jurisprudence italienne en matibre de conflit de lois de 1935
a x949, 39 RauE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVk 159 and 341 (195o). Several comments
by Italian authors on Italian and foreign decisions on conflicts cases are to be found in the twelve-volume
collection "Giurisprudenza Comparata di Diritto Internazionale Privato," edited from 1937 to 1956 by
the "Istituto Italiano di Studi Legislativi" in Rome.

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Kelsen's "reine Rechtslehre," which had a great influence on Italian legal thinking,
and similar trends in Italian jurisprudence, stressing the importance of "formal"
problems of legal structure and classification, were responsible for the disproportionate amount of effort spent in Italy on the theoretical side of the subject. The
nature, function, and mechanism of the "choice-of-law rule" have been the main
subjects of research by Italian students of private international law since Anziotti
started playing the game.
B. The Transformation Problem
One line of inquiry was about the process by which a provision pertaining to a
foreign private law becomes operative in the Italian legal order, and vice versa.
Starting from the axiomatic presupposition that each State has its own discrete and
independent legal order, Italian theorists were hard put to explain the application
therein of rules belonging to another State's order, which appears to be the effect-or
the most striking effect-of the rules on conflict of laws. That foreign law applied
as such-either proprio vigore or under a grant of power by public international law
--was contrary to the basic premise of the separation and self-sufficiency of each
national legal order.
The way out of the dilemma was mostly found in the theory that national rules
of private international law "nationalize" the private law rules of the foreign legal
orders to which they refer. To explain in more technical terms this phenomenon
of transfer and formal transformation of legal rules effected by the "choice" of a
foreign law, some authors maintained that the choice-of-law rules themselves were
empty frames that received their contents from the foreign legal systems which they
declared to be "applicable" to the case (so-called "rinvio recettizio" or "rinvio
materiale"), x Later on, dissatisfied with that clumsy and grotesque image, other
commentators favored the view that a choice-of-law rule, by pointing to a foreign
legal order as the depository of the correct solution for the case at hand, recreates
in its own legal order a provision homologous to the one that in the foreign system
covers the relationship envisaged by the conflicts rule.11 A system of national
private international law, therefore, activates a special process (an automatic one,
according to Tomaso Perassi's last refinement)' through which new rules are
continuously created inside the legal order of the forum State by imitation, so to say,
1
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of the legal provisions of those States to which each fact situation is connected by the
link made relevant for that type of situation by the conflicts rule. In other words, a
conflicts rule is a rule (of national law) that has the peculiar effect of setting up a
special body of legal provisions to cover certain cases related to foreign countries
and to foreign people.
C. Unilateralism and Bilateralism
Another effort of Italian theory in the last fifty years has been to "cleanse" the
concepts of private international law of all lingering "residues" of the original
nineteenth century public international law approach. Probably this goal has not
been fully reached yet, and possibly it is not worth pursuing to the bitter end, because a lasting charm of the subject may be indeed its international flavor and appeal.
Be that as it may, the cleansing intent is particularly noticeable in the long-drawn
discussion about the "function" of private international law. Does the typical
choice-of-law rule, which states that the legal import-validity or effect-of a relationship connected to a "country" by a given "point of contact" will be assessed
according to the law of that country, envisage both foreign law and the lex fori, or
the former only, or only the latter? To use the current terminology, are conflicts
rules "bilateral" or "unilateral," and, if they are unilateral, do they point inward
or outward?
The traditional and, so to say, the pre-critical view has been that the application
both of foreign and (at least sometimes, i.e., in case of doubt) of local rules depends
on a choice made by private international law. Not so, it was objected: this is
tantamount to making that branch of law-although avowedly national in character
-into a sort of supernational system, hovering (another "brooding omnipresence in
the sky"!) over all national orders, including-paradoxically-its own. Such a view,
therefore, is a distorted reflection of the exploded theory which regarded conflicts
rules as a part of the legal system that is indeed superior to States, and maybe to their
legal orders too, namely public international law. To maintain, for instance, that
Italian private law applies in Italy only in so far-at least in principle-as facts and
relationships are connected to Italy by the connecting factors used by Italian choice-oflaw rules, exacdy as French law applies in Italy when facts and relationships are
connected to France according to the same Italian conflicts rules, is tantamount to
asserting that a choice of laws must be carried out on a level superior to the legal
system to which the choice-of-law rule itself belongs.
On the contrary, it is argued, from the point of view of each legal system, its
own rules of private law are applicable per se; there is no need of a choice in favor
of Italian law by the Italian conflicts rules to make it applicable in Italy. The purpose
and function of Italian conflicts rules is only to give force of law in Italy to foreign
rules, which otherwise would have no legal effect in the Italian legal system.
This opinion has been presented and upheld with great skill and care by

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

Roberto Ago, in his Teoria del diritto internazionale privato.3 In this book the
threads and patterns of previous doctrines have been interwoven, integrated, and
logically developed, thus offering a very impressive statement of what one may still
call the leading Italian theory of conflict of laws. As a matter of fact, all further
work in the field as to fundamentals has been either directed to improve upon
Ago's views, by adding further refinements or developments, 4 or to criticize some
of his conclusions and even to overturn his whole theory. 5
The latter goal is attained by Rolando Quadri.'
After an independent and
steady search for a more satisfactory explanation of some troublesome difficulties
inherent in the subject matter," Quadri has just offered an imposing statement of
his latest convictions, as a closely knit theoretical structure, in his Lezioni di diritto
internazionale privato. s Quadri's system-it is indeed a full-fledged system of
thought-is both the most recent and the most original contribution to Italian
conflicts theory, and deserves careful examination. At the moment, however, we
shall merely point out that on the question of the "function" of private international
law proper, namely, of State rules on the application of State law, Quadri opposes
to Ago's opinion-that the raison d'etre of conflicts rules is to make foreign laws
applicable-a revised version of the early twentieth-century theory which holds that
the rules of private international law simply or primarily establish when the private
law rules of their own system apply.
On the other hand, in Ago's wake, and right after the publication of Ago's book,
Giacinto Bosco advanced a middle-of-the-road theory.'
Assuming that choice-oflaw rules aim at governing "international cases," namely relationships connected
with different legal orders, Bosco concluded that only cases having connections
solely with the forum State come directly under the forum law, while cases that
1"
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are connected also with foreign States (besides having, necessarily, a link with the
forum: otherwise they could not come up for decision there) depend for their legal
evaluation on the rules of private international law of the forum, which will bring
about the application to them either of a foreign law or of the lex fori itself. In
other words, according to Bosco's (isolated) viewpoint, while foreign law always
depends on private international law in order to be applicable, the lex fori is applicable per se to "wholly national" cases and is applicable by way of conflicts rules
(including the public policy principle) to prima facie "mixed" (national-foreign)
cases, because only the latter, and not the former, imply a conflict of laws, a doul*
as to the applicable law.
III
THE DOMINANT THEORY

The safest and simplest way of summarizing the current views on the general
problems of private international law in Italy is to follow the lead of the tiny but
well executed "primer" by Gaetano Morelli, where the detailed discussion by Ago
is synthetized and brought up to date for students' use.2 °
Choice-of-law rules, says Morelli, are rules of national law, and more precisely
belong to public (constitutional) law, because they supervise the creation of special
rules of private law, modeled on those of the "governing" foreign order, for the legal
assessment of relationships with one or more "foreign elements." Their subject
matter is social facts, but they govern these only indirectly, by choosing the (foreign)
legal order that will supply the necessary provisions for their conclusive legal
evaluation. As we already saw apropos of Ago's theory, the lex jori applies independently of any choice-of-law rule; it applies because it is there, as the private law
branch of the national legal order. It may only be displaced by some special provisions of the same legal order, and precisely by those that are created according to
the rules of private international law. As to the other main questions of a general
import usually debated in the appraisal of the structure and functioning of conflicts rules-characterization, connecting factors, "renvoi," public policy, proof of
the applicable foreign law-these are Ago's and Morelli's common conclusions:
Characterization, which is a necessary step for the determination of the apposite
choice-of-law rule, has to be effected according to the lex fori. In other words, one
"thinks away" the foreign contacts that raise a choice-of-law problem, and looks for
n
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the rule that covers the case in the legal order taken as a starting point (lex fori).
Then one inquires what conflicts rule makes use of the concept underlying that legal
provision. The conflicts rule thus found will lead to the applicable foreign law
through the connecting element which it uses. Finally, the foreign legal provisiori
to be applied will be discovered by placing the relationship (stripped of any possible
connection with legal orders different from the chosen one, if no "renvoi" is admitted,
as is common opinion in Italy) in the perspective of the appropriate foreign legal
order, a process that will require a "second characterization," to be carried out according to the same foreign law.
Connecting factors also require characterizing, as a rule; the exception being
the situs of immovables, which is considered a mere fact, to be ascertained without
reference to legal ideas and definitions. Here, too, characterization is made by the
interpretation of the terms of reference of the choice-of-law rule in accordance with
the lex fori. However, to substantiate the connecting factor of "nationality"--so
important in Italian private international law-one looks at the nationality laws of
each State. Should the propositus have dual nationality, the citizenship acquired by
him for reasons more similar to those accepted by Italian law for granting Italian
citizenship will prevail. Should he be stateless, a supplementary criterion will have
to be established (in Italian law, it is residence).
As to "renvoi," it is logically unfounded. Apart from the usual objection that
remission ("rinvio indietro") leads to a circulus inextricabilis, both remission and
transmission ("rinvio oltre") contradict the purpose and power of the national rules
of private international law to make a definite and autonomous choice of the applicable law.
Since the lex fori is the basic and potentially always the applicable law, whenever
the foreign "competent" law is discarded because it would bring about a result
contrary to the local "public policy," i.e., to some fundamental principle of the forum
State's legal order, the case will be decided as if no foreign law were involved.
The "exception of public policy" (an exception to the "normal" outcome of private
international law, which is the application of some foreign law) is also called the
"limit of public policy" ("limite dell' ordine pubblico") because, when a foreign
rule is not "acceptable," the conflicts rule that would have led to its application in
the forum is paralyzed (fenced in, so to say), and the lex fori takes over, as does
the general law when no special rule stands in its way.
For the same reason, whenever the foreign applicable law is not available, particularly because its contents cannot be determined for want of pertinent and reliable
information, the case will be decided on the basis of the lex fori.
As to the proof of foreign law, Morelli-who is the leading Italian specialist on
the law of international civil procedure and jurisdiction 2 '-maintains that the
principle "jura novit curia" extends to foreign rules of law when these are transformed into national provisions by Italian choice-of-law rules.
1 See GAETANO MORELLI, Dxrrro PROCESSUALE CIVILE INTERNAZIONALE (2d

DnUrrO PROCESSUALE civiLE

rAZmmoALn

(296r).

ed. 1954); d., Srunz Dt

ITAMAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

817

Iv
THE THEORY OF QUADRI

Almost on all counts, Quadri differs. As already mentioned, he believes that
rules of private international law, properly understood, merely relate to the legal
order of which they are part. They are indeed an indispensable element of every
rule of private law of every country, because they contribute to make it complete
by fixing its scope, thus turning it into a real norma agendi-a prescription capable

of affecting specific human behavior.
No State shapes its law as if the other countries did not exist and people had no
relationships across their national borders. On the contrary, this obvious fact and
the consequence thereof, namely, that human relationships often impinge on different communities at the same time, are taken into careful consideration everywhere.
Hence States do not make their rules of law all-embracing. Just as they limit the
validity of rules of law "in time" (by the rules of intertemporal law), so they limit
their effect "in space." They specify, either within the rule itself ("norme autolimitate," Nussbaum's "spatially conditioned internal rules"2 ) or by adding a
particular set of conditioning rules (the ruies of private international law), to whom
(citizens, domiciliaries, residents), to what acts (those done within the national
boundaries, or aboard ships on the high seas carrying the national flag, and so on)
and to what goods (those situated in the country, or in transitu therein, and so on)
each version of their system of private law applies.
By the positive law approach, in order to know whether a fact of social life is
regulated by a State's legal system, and, if so, what legal effects the latter attaches
thereto, one must look at the "norms" of that legal system, namely, to its substantive rules plus the rules stating the conditions for their applicability, among
which the conflict-of-laws rules are of decisive importance. Let us suppose that a
case lacks those connections with the local community which the rules of private
international law of that country require to make the local law applicable: for
instance, the propositus is a foreigner, while to that sort of relationship the local law
applies only when the parties are nationals of the forum State. Then, according to
Quadri, it has to be determined whether some foreign legal order considers the case
as falling within the scope of its own norms.
Should there be one, and only one, the solution that would be given by its
norms to the problem under consideration will be given also in the legal order
where the question arises (or in reference to which it is envisaged). There is, in
fact, says Quadri, a general principle of law, operative in every modern legal system,
according to which a State is ready and willing to include in its law rules modeled
" ARTHU NUSSAUm, PRINCIPLES OF PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 72 (1943).
On such rules see
De Nova, I conflltti di leggi e le norme con apposita delimitazione della sfera di eflcacia, 13 DiiRrro
INTERAZIONALE 13 (1959); id., Conflits de lois et normes fixant leur propre domaine d'application, x
MLANGES OFPERTS A JACQuEs MAURY 377 (x96o); id., Ancora sulle norme sostanziali "autolimitate:"
13 DIRrrro INTERNATIONALE 500 (1959); Graulich, R gles de conflit et ragles d'apphication immidiate, 2
MiLANG.S EN L'HONNEUR DE JEAN DAIsN 629 (1963).
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on foreign norms, whenever fact situations occur which its own norms-as conditioned by their rules of private international law-do not cover, while they are
controlled by a foreign legal system. The foreign law applies on two conditions,
then: a negative one, that the former law has no provision covering the case, because
from its viewpoint, as stated by its rules of private international law, it is not
sufficiently related to that national community; and a positive one, that according to
its own rules of private international law, the foreign law "wants" to apply.
Characterization, in Quadri's theory, is always effected according to the conceptions of the legal order the possible application of which is envisaged, be it the
lex fori or a foreign law. It is nothing more than interpretation.
No problem of "renvoi" arises, either, although foreign rules of private international law are to be followed too, precisely because the foreign law, exactly like
the local law, applies only if it extends to the specific facts of the case, in view of its
character and connections. Since private international law rules have a meaning only
as a conditioning factor of the applicability of the other rules of their own system,
the passage from the forum's legal order to a foreign one and then-through the
latter's choice-of-law rules-back to the forum's law ("Riickverweisung") or forward
to a third legal system ("Weiterverweisung") is not even conceivable. But on the
other hand-contrary to the "no-renvoi" theory-neither is the application of foreign
law dependent on the forum's "conditioning" rules (private international law) and
independent from its own. It is exactly the opposite. The only, but basic and
primary, intervention of the forum's private international law is aimed at establishing
whether the lex fori has a rule of its own applying to the case.
Connecting factors are also fashioned by each legal system as an indispensable

part of its rules of private international law and are operative as to their respective
substantive rules. Their interpretation and ascertainment, therefore, depend on the
views and purposes of the legal system using them. What is true of nationality, by
common consent, is true of all connecting factors, in Quadri's theory, because they
connect a relationship only to their own legal system, and it is unthinkable (or it
would be plainly foolish) to resort to the views of any other order to define them
and make them real, adequate to the purpose of the rule of private international
law of which they are part2
One should think that Quadri's approach would blur to extinction, as a separate
concept, the idea of "ordre public." His theory, at least if it were carried over and
thoroughly developed in positive law, seems bound to free private international law
of that peculiar and elusive notion. He disparages the continental delusion (often
unconscious) that the positive rules of private international law are those laid down
by codes and statutes. He points out that these statutory rules are usually too broad,
indefinite, ambiguous, and primitive to give due completeness to all substantive rules.
" The importance of the lex causae for the ascertainment of connecting factors is stressed, contrary
to the common view, by Barile, Collegamento (Criteri di collegamento, dir. intern. priv.), 7 ENCICLOPEDIA
-DEL DIRIrro 350 (ig6o). See also Bentivoglio, Sulla natura dei criteri di collegamento utilizzati dalla
norma di diritto internazionale privato, 8 CoMUNICAZIoNr E STtDnI 143 (x956).

ITALIAN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

Rather, the import and scope of the latter should be discovered (and already at
present they often are, but surreptitiously) in the light of the purpose of those individual rules themselves and of the general policies of their legal order. But this, one
would suppose, should be true also of certain principles that, at a given time, are
considered to be fundamental in a country, even if they have not found expression in

statutory enactments, or are only indirectly apparent. And according to Quadri, once
we know that a relationship comes within the "reach" of a national rule (or principle),
there is no question of looking at a foreign law. Therefore, the usual distinction between the refusal to apply a foreign rule because a national one applies and'because,
although the foreign law should prima facie be applicable, it must be set aside, as
contrary to local "public policy," in favor of an unswerving principle of the forum's
law, becomes meaningless.
Quadri indeed insists that-exactly as for the usual application of the lex fori-the
public policy argument can be raised only when the case is materially connected to
the forum State. And yet he does build a place apart for the principles affecting
public policy, which, as such, apply even when "normally" a foreign law would and
should apply. One might say that in Quadri's framework "ordre public" is really
the "still unfinished part" of private international law: where private international
rules are not yet specific enough, one must allow the play of a sort of general rule
according to which local law also applies whenever it reflects a principle that, at the
time, claims obedience even outside the limits set by the current rules of private
international law.
Finally, Quadri disagrees with Morelli even with regard to the proof of foreign
law, although both authors are agreed that foreign rules apply as "nationalized"
rules, and both maintain that foreign law is never applied as such, but is only prelegal material for the creation of homologous national rules. But Quadri refuses to
follow Morelli in equating, for that reason, national rules that are such, so to say,
ab origine, and national rules reflecting foreign ones. Precisely because the second
type of rules are the fruit of a special technique of "adaptation," they may well be
dealt with differently, for certain purposes, than those of the former type. There
are indeed substantial reasons for doing so in the matter of proof. One cannot say,
for instance, that judges are usually as well equipped to know foreign laws as they
are to ascertain the content and import of their own. This is enough to make it
appear more convenient that foreign laws be handled, in the matter of proof, more
like facts than like legal rules, although it would be also unfortunate to equate them
to mere facts. They are something in between, and as such deserve special treatment
in court proceedings (particularly, judicial notice of some rules of foreign law
could be taken more easily than is done with facts) .2
We have seen that according to Quadri, when a legal order fashions a rule as
covering a certain type of situation connected to that State in a certain way, that
2
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rule will apply to situations of that kind in every other State too, unless the same
situation, although connected with the first State, is placed by the rules of private
international law of the second one, by stressing a different connection, under the
provisions of the latter State. A law that "wants to apply" applies everywhere,
unless it comes into competition with a lex fori that wants to apply as well. But
quid juris when the lex fori is not interested, while the laws of two or more foreign
States want to rule over the case? And what if conversely, no legal order claims
to have legislative jurisdiction over a case that happens to be connected in fact only
to States which treat those connections as immaterial? This is the well known
difficulty encountered by previous "introvert" and "vested rights" theories of private
international law.
Quadri tries to minimize the impact of the objection by assuring that the difficulty
-particularly the so-called "negative conflict of laws"-will occur only seldom, and
by counter-attacking with a list of difficulties encountered by the opponents in
carrying out their own techniques of choice of law. He must recognize, however,
that something is to be done to overcome the "impasse" facing his theory when there
is competition between States, or, on the contrary, general indifference as to the legal
regulation of certain relationships.
With a valiant respect for logic, Quadri makes his task particularly hard by refusing to enter the easy way out suggested by former explorers of the "unilateral"
technique:25 to cut the Gordian knot by simply giving effect to any one of two or
more competing legal systems, or, respectively, to fill the gap by twisting the forum's
rules of private international law into rules able to effect also a choice among two or
more "disinterested" foreign legal systems. This is sheer self-contradiction to Quadri.
He falls back, instead, for the solution of the "positive conflict of laws," on two
general propositions: the comparative effectiveness of legal rules, and the respect for
the expectation of the interested parties as to the law governing their relationship.
Accordingly, the forum will receive that foreign law which appears to be, in the
circumstances of the individual case, the "proper law" (lex conveniens), the law
having the more real connection with the transaction and on which the parties
probably relied in their dealings.
How he proposes to solve a "negative conflict," a case of universal "desistment,"
is not so clear. This is indeed a tough dilemma. One might suggest, in the spirit
of Quadri's system, that since no stated rule appears to be applicable here, each lex
fori will fill the gap by creating new and apposite rules, possibly finding inspiration
in the legal system that has a comparatively significant connection with the case.
Quadri himself envisages the possibility that an "international case" require the
creation of substantive rules ad hoc. He maintains, indeed, that when the character
On these authors (Schnell and Niedner in Germany at the turn of the nineteenth century, Niboyet
in France and Sohn in the United States in recent times, Pilenko in Russia around x915 and later
abroad), see
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of "public policy" affects an institution of the lex fori only partially, thus fragmentizing the foreign law adopted, and the case cannot be reasonably settled because
both laws are thus crippled, one must turn to first principles and draw from them
a special rule of decision.
A

PERSONAL CONCLUSION

To close this survey on a personal note, I avow that writing it was for me more
than an intellectual exercise: it meant going over my own efforts of thirty-five years
to understand this baffling subject. Unfortunately, I have no solution of my own
to offer (not yet!). I hope, at least, to have been a faithful and fairly clear2' expounder of the main trends and tenets-past and present 2.0-ofthe "Italian school"
of private international law, to which I am proud to belong.
" Very likely, however, I was too rash to write in an acquired language on a subject that puts a strain
on style even when using one's own mother tongue.
" For a more detailed examination and a very full bibliography, see the surveys that have been
published in "Comunicazioni e Studi" by Pau and Malintoppi for 1945-5' (Vol. 4, PP. 483 and 505,
respectively), by Malintoppi for 1952-53 (Vol. 5, P- 499), by Bentivoglio for 1954-55 (Vol. 7, P. 439),
by Ruini for 1956-57 (Vol. 1o, P. 471), and by Ballarino for 1958-6o (Vol. ii, in preparation).

